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The Tools and Levers of Access to Patented Health 
Related Genetic Invention in Canada 
S. Tina Piper  
INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that there is a prevailing problem of access to 
genetic invention in Canada caused by disputes over intellectual 
property (―IP‖) rights arising from conflicting normative orders. A 
variety of tools have been suggested and developed to remedy 
blockages to genetic invention caused by intellectual property (―IP‖) 
rights, including proposals for legislative reform, open source 
licensing initiatives, international standard setting, and information 
aggregation projects. I argue that determining which tool will work 
requires comprehending how the tool will interact with the 
characteristics of the local legal order. I draw on legal pluralist 
insights that regard state law as merely one form of legal regulation, 
and the local legal order as comprised of formal and informal rules 
developed by communities of practice.
1
 I also develop the premise 
that a one-size-fits-all approach to enabling access through IP rights 
is likely to be as unsuccessful as one-size-fits-all approaches have 
been to regulating IP rights more generally.
2
  
Implemented properly, access-increasing changes could enhance 
the effectiveness of IP law-making systems. Reforms would consider 
how the tools could be applied in a contextual manner that reflects 
 
  Assistant Professor, McGill University Faculty of Law, Research Director of the 
Centre for Intellectual Property Policy. 
 1. See Emmanuel Melissaris, The More the Merrier? A New Take on Legal Pluralism, 13 
SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 57 (2004); Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal 
Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443 (1992). 
 2. See Robin Jacob, One Size Fits All?, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN 
GENOME PROJECT 449 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003); David Vaver, Need Intellectual Property Be 
Everywhere?: Against Ubiquity and Uniformity, 25 DALHOUSIE L.J. 1 (2002). 
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the state and characteristics of local IP legal orders. I consider the 
appropriateness of various forms of legal rule reform in the Canadian 
context given the institutions that most influence access to 
innovation. I conclude, based on empirical research, that the most 
effective lever for ensuring access to health-related genetic invention 
in Canada is to influence national university technology transfer 
officers, adapting the tool of voluntary standards developed 
internationally to suit their purposes rather than formulating 
legislation or otherwise formally amending state law. I begin by 
investigating the nature of the access problem. 
I. AN ACCESS PROBLEM 
Limited access to important genetic health technologies is often a 
result of the collision of informal rule-making orders with formal IP 
law regimes. I argue that the observed access problems can be best 
remedied by understanding and accommodating the formal and 
informal legal rules that bind parties. This Part investigates, first, how 
access to important health technologies is structured and limited and, 
second, the details of two particular conflicts involving access in 
Canada that highlight the various formal and informal rules at play in 
access disputes.  
Many valuable genetic technologies are patented, principally in 
the United States and other jurisdictions. Over time, biotechnology 
patents on genetic invention have increased globally and encompass 
more and more of the genome. In the United States, for example, 
more than 13,000 biotechnology patents were granted in 2000, up 
from 2,000 in 1985.
3
 This demonstrates the rapid growth of patents 
on research tools that surround drug development.
4
 Patent claims 
center around certain gene hotspots valuable for clinical applications, 
leaving whole expanses of the human genome uncharted. In 2005, 
researchers concluded that 20% of human genes are held under 4,270 
U.S. patents.
5
 Much of this innovation rests in private hands: 78% of 
 
 3. John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical 
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 293 (Wesley M. Cohen & 
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). 
 4. Id. at 293–94. 
 5. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/4
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U.S. DNA patents as of 2004 were held by for-profit institutions, and 
22% were held by non-profits.
6
 Universities increasingly hold a 
greater number of life science patents and derive substantial licensing 
revenue from licensing innovations and technology transfer.
7
 General 
trends also show an increasing level of international collaboration in 
patent applications.
8
  
In this context of increased patenting of genes by private firms 
and universities and international collaboration, international legal 
and scientific policy communities mobilized in the 1990s and 2000s 
to address concerns regarding an ―anti-commons‖ of biomedical 
research.
9
 An over-allocation of proprietary rights, i.e., patents, could 
block research by creating an ―anti-commons‖ where valuable 
knowledge remained underexploited. Patent holders could stack 
royalties to extract monopoly profits, block upstream research with 
concurrent patents, deter research through over-broad or invalid 
patents,
10
 and exclusively license their innovations, creating a 
situation where downstream researchers would be unable to research 
or develop any products.
11
 Thus the anti-commons could result not 
only from the grant of patent rights but also from restrictive 
downstream licensing practices. This situation was contrasted with 
the ―tragedy of the commons,‖ or the over-exploitation that results 
from no formal allocation of property rights.
12
 Thus, patents would 
 
310 SCIENCE 239, 239 (2005). 
 6. Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic Institutions: An 
Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 31, 33 (2006). 
 7. Walsh et al., supra note 3, at 295. 
 8. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 2008 
COMPENDIUM OF PATENT STATISTICS 1, 7 (2008), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/19/3756 
9377.pdf. 
 9. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, 
and Standard Setting, in 1 NBER INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 124 (Adam B. 
Jaffe et al. eds., 2001); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Michael A. 
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 622 (1998). 
 10. One study demonstrated that 38% of patent claims filed with the USPTO in a one-year 
period for nine selected genetic diseases had problems that might lead to their invalidity. Jordan 
Paradise et al., Patents on Human Genes: An Analysis of Scope and Claims, 307 SCIENCE 1566, 
1566 (2005). 
 11. Id. at 1567. 
 12. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
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have the unintended effect of limiting, rather than stimulating, 
innovation, impeding both research and the provision of clinical 
genetic products, particularly genetic diagnostic tests. These opinions 
fed into the moral and practical concerns expressed by policy-makers, 
health care specialists, and religious groups that granting gene patents 
could limit access to valuable technologies developed from those 
genes, increase the costs of healthcare, and commodify the human 
body.
13
 An influential study indicated that 75% of scientists based at 
government, academic, and private research institutions and 
corporations were opposed to the commercialization of the results of 
the Human Genome Project, and 90% of respondents thought that 
excessive DNA patenting was a problem.
14
  
The data were mixed, however, about the extent of 
commodification, an anti-commons, and a resultant access crisis.
15
 
Most recently, Caulfield et al. thoroughly surveyed the evidence for 
and against an access crisis up to 2006.
16
 This retrospective study 
suggests that fears regarding access principally resulted from 
speculation in the academic and policy fields in the early part of the 
21st century rather than strong empirical data.
17
 Although there are 
limited data on the effects of patents on access in general,
18
 the one 
empirical study of the issue concluded that there is a modest ―anti-
commons‖ effect that becomes worse the longer an invention has 
been patented.
19
 
 
 13. E.g., NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA (2002), 
available at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf; 
DANISH COUNCIL OF ETHICS, PATENTING HUMAN GENES AND STEM CELLS 89 (2004), 
available at http://etiskraad.synkron.com/graphics/03_udgivelser/engelske_publikationer/ 
patenting_human_genes/patents04/patenting_human_genes.pdf; David B. Resnik, DNA Patents 
and Human Dignity, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 152 (2001). 
 14. Isaac Rabino, How Human Geneticists in U.S. View Commercialization of the Human 
Genome Project, 29 NATURE GENETICS 15, 15 (2001). 
 15. Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene 
Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1091–94 (2006); see also 
STEPHEN HANSEN ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF PATENTING IN THE AAAS SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 
1 (2006), http://sippi.aaas.org/survey/AAAS_IP_Survey_Report.pdf. 
 16. Caulfied et al., supra note 15, at 1091–94. 
 17. Id.  
 18. See E. Gold et al., Gene Patents—More Evidence Needed, But Policymakers Must Act, 
25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 388, 388 (2007) (opining on Caulfield et al., supra note 15). 
 19. Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder the Free 
Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis 30–31 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/4
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The quantitative data cause some concern about an access 
―problem,‖ particularly given the importance of this area to human 
health and welfare, and when contrasted with the underlying purpose 
of patent law to incentivize innovation and dissemination of valuable 
technologies. The access problem is concretely demonstrated by 
particular problems of access to patented genetic inventions by 
healthcare professionals.
20
 I will consider two examples that have 
affected Canada that demonstrate the access problems caused by 
patents over foundational genetic inventions and their licensing 
downstream, particularly exclusive licensing.  
First, Myriad Genetics obtained patents in the United States, in 
Canada, at the European Patent Office (―EPO‖), and in other 
jurisdictions for various aspects of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes 
and diagnostic tests for breast cancer.
21
 Myriad‘s goal was to enter 
into licensing agreements with private laboratories that would then 
send tests to Myriad‘s Laboratories in Salt Lake City.22 Myriad‘s 
broader goal was to fund its nascent therapeutics division through 
diagnostic testing and create a network of healthcare providers who 
would use its products.
23
 In Canada, Myriad entered into an 
agreement with MDS Laboratories, which then negotiated with 
provincial governments about providing genetic diagnostic testing 
through MDS and Myriad.
24
 The Ontario provincial government did 
not respond to Myriad and MDS‘s requests for six months, a 
 
(Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005). Referring to the U.S. Bayh-
Dole Act to either support or refute an access crisis is of limited probity as most research 
suggests that the Act has had little effect on patenting and licensing practices. David C. Mowery 
et al., The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the 
Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 30 RES. POL‘Y 99, 103–18 (2001); see also Matthew 
Rafferty, The Bayh-Dole Act and University Research and Development, 37 RES. POL‘Y 29, 29 
(2008) (stating that the Bayh-Dole Act might have provided an incentive for universities to shift 
focus from basic to applied research in order to generate revenue). 
 20. I will focus on Canadian ―stories‖ as the later case study reviews Canadian 
developments.  
 21. E. RICHARD GOLD & JULIA CARBONE, MYRIAD GENETICS: IN THE EYE OF THE POLICY 
STORM 10–11 (2008), http://www.theinnovationpartnership.org/data/ieg/documents/cases/TIP 
_Myriad)_Report.pdf.  
 22. Id. at 21. 
 23. Id. at 9.  
 24. Id. at 11. Myriad repeated or attempted to replicate this business model in numerous 
other jurisdictions including Australia, Japan, the United States, the U.K., France, and 
Switzerland. Id. at 11–12. 
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significant time for Myriad but reasonable within government time 
frames, in order to consider the implications of the increased cost of 
Myriad‘s tests on government services.25  
Public laboratories continued to administer their own tests during 
that period.
26
 Myriad became frustrated with the government‘s lack 
of response and, on the advice of MDS, sent public laboratories 
cease-and-desist letters threatening litigation should they continue in-
house testing for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes rather than sending 
samples (at three times the cost) to Myriad‘s laboratories or exclusive 
licensee for testing.
27
 Myriad‘s cease-and-desist letters stopped 
testing at the B.C. Hereditary Cancer Program, but other programs 
continued their testing activities.
28
 Myriad‘s behavior raised a furor in 
Canada, particularly after Myriad sent a series of letters to the 
Ontario government from U.S. representatives threatening trade 
sanctions and from U.S. scientists criticizing Canadian testing 
methods.
29
 These actions and others were heavily reported by the 
media,
30
 leading to expressed opposition from provincial ministers, 
premiers, and national breast cancer charities.
31
 Conferences and 
negotiations continued between the provincial governments, the 
federal government, and Myriad.
32
 The government was unable to 
find a consensus position among the various departments involved, 
and eventually the dispute petered out in the face of the 2003 SARS 
crisis in Ontario.
33
 The controversy regarding Myriad led to reports 
and changes to the Canadian Intellectual Property Office‘s (―CIPO‖) 
Manual of Patent Office Practice (―MOPOP‖).34 Two influential 
 
 25. Id. at 24–25. 
 26. Id. at 26. 
 27. Bryan Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and 
Application of Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 141–42 (2002) (detailing the 
situation that arose in Canada). 
 28. Id.; NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 13, at 40. 
 29. GOLD & CARBONE, supra note 21, at 25–26. 
 30. Id. at 26. 
 31. William-Jones, supra note 27, at 143–44. 
 32. GOLD & CARBONE, supra note 21, at 26–28. 
 33. Id. 
 34. CANADIAN BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMM., PATENTING OF HIGHER LIFE FORMS 
AND RELATED ISSUES: REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA BIOTECHNOLOGY 
MINISTERIAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE (2002), available at http://www.ic.gc/eic/site/ 
cbac-cccb.nsf/vwapj/E980_IC_IntelProp_e.pdf/$FILE/E980_IC_IntelProp_e.pdf; ONTARIO 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/4
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Canadian reports, spurred on by the Myriad crisis, recommended 
expanding and clarifying the research use exemption in patent law.
35
 
Although agencies in B.C. and Ontario voluntarily suspended some 
testing, Myriad did not bring legal action or refuse to license its tests 
to public health agencies.
36
  
Myriad bridged two interpretive communities, each with its own 
norms and practices: the research community governed principally by 
norms of science, and the business community driven by a different 
set of rules and formal patent law.
37
 Myriad had exclusively licensed 
its test to a commercial test provider and paid insufficient attention to 
the fact that this decision limited or appeared to limit research and 
access to its test.
38
 Judging from its response and previous practice, 
the community of researchers and health practitioners was governed 
by a norm of communalism, particularly where technologies with 
valuable public health applications might be concerned.
39
 Although 
state law had legitimized Myriad‘s actions through granting a patent, 
the informal normative order worked differently. Myriad failed to 
appreciate how the norms that governed its business decisions in the 
United States might not be the same as the informal rules that 
governed such decisions in Canada‘s public healthcare and research 
environment. The working solution to the dispute was that Myriad‘s 
patents were eventually ignored in Canada by diagnostic test 
providers in the public healthcare system, one possible response to a 
formal assertion of rights.  
The second example of an access problem to health-related 
genetic invention is that of Warnex Inc.,
40
 resulting again from 
apparently conflicting normative orders. Warnex sent letters across 
Canada stating that the company had an exclusive licence to a genetic 
 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, GENETICS, TESTING & GENE PATENTING: CHARTING NEW TERRITORY 
IN HEALTHCARE 89 (2002), available at http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ 
ministry_reports/geneticsrep02/genetics.html. 
 35. CANADIAN BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMM., supra note 34, at 15; ONTARIO 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, supra note 34, at 88. 
 36. GOLD & CARBONE, supra note 21, at 28. 
 37. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE: THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS (Norman W. Storer ed., 1973). 
 38. See supra notes 21–37 and accompanying text. 
 39. Further empirical research would be required to fully describe those norms. 
 40. Warnex, http://warnex.ca (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
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test for the JAK2 gene and myeloproliferative disorders (affecting 
blood cells).
41
 Warnex followed the letter with site visits in some 
instances.
42
 Upon publication of the scientific results underpinning 
the test, ―Canadian laboratories quickly developed [their own version 
of the] genetic [diagnostic] tests‖ for use by Canadian healthcare 
providers at cost.
43
 The Institut Gustave Roussy (―IGR‖) ―has applied 
for a patent over the [JAK2] gene and related diagnostic methods,‖ 
together with other French public institutions, and has ―exclusively 
licensed the . . . gene and [related diagnostic tests] to Ipsogen, a 
French private company.‖44 No patent has issued for either the gene 
or the diagnostic test in Canada.
45
 The responses obtained from 
laboratory directors suggest that some believe that Warnex was 
proposing to sue them, but Warnex says that it merely hopes to 
provide a service to public laboratories.
46
 Ultimately, IGR is seeking 
a patent on the gene; it has exclusively licensed the technology, and 
there remains a perception that Warnex may limit access to the 
diagnostic test. This contrasts with the established practices of 
directors of diagnostic laboratories, who embrace a more communal 
philosophy toward the availability of their research results for public 
health purposes.
47
 Thus I conclude, based on the data and cases 
discussed, that an access dilemma exists in Canada. Resolving it will 
bridge normative communities and thus require subtle legal tools.  
II. ACCESS TOOLS AND LEVERS 
Scholars, international policy-makers, civil society, industry, and 
politicians have proposed a variety of sites of regulation to effect 
―increased access.‖ These prescriptions often focus on state law as 
the most promising site of regulation through legislation and judicial 
 
 41. TINA PIPER & E. RICHARD GOLD, PRACTICES, POLICES AND POSSIBILITIES IN 
LICENSING IN HUMAN GENETICS 12–14 (2008), http://www.theinnovationpartnership.org/data/ 
documents/00000015-1.pdf.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 12–13. 
 45. Id. at 13. 
 46. Id. Even if a patent eventually is granted, it is unlikely that the damages Warnex could 
obtain ever would match the cost of bringing suit and the damage to its public image. Id. 
 47. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/4
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norm creation principally by case law. I argue that the solution to 
access problems created by IP rights in Canada likely will arise from 
informal para-lawmaking rather than through state-based law-
making. The nature and scope of these informal rules and practices 
will depend on contextual factors that will vary in each jurisdiction 
and require gradual institutional change. Thus a subtle understanding 
of the Canadian policy context is critical to unearthing those levers of 
change, data that will be presented in the third part. In the final 
section of this paper I discuss private ordering (IP licensing practices 
including open source licensing), international standard setting, and 
information aggregation initiatives as possible levers that could be (or 
have been) adapted to Canadian conditions to enable success. 
A. State Law: Legislative Reform 
The first approach has been to address access problems to genetic 
technologies in the health sector through state-based initiatives to 
reform, amend, or improve the function of formal legal rules. These 
mechanisms include proposals such as legislative reform (e.g., an 
exception for health technologies in the Patent Act),
48
 broadening the 
research use exemption in patent law, prohibiting gene patents 
entirely, and improving patent quality, specifically by ensuring that 
criteria of novelty and obviousness are strictly enforced.
49
 In Canada, 
for example, the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 
recommended that Parliament institute a legislative research 
(experimental use) exception to ensure that health research was not 
stalled due to real or perceived fears regarding patent infringement.
50
 
Legislation has the advantage of being highly authoritative, clear, and 
universally enforceable by the State, generally taking precedence 
over all law except the Constitution in common-law jurisdictions. For 
 
 48. Canada Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4 (1985). 
 49. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM‘N, GENES AND INGENUITY: GENE PATENTING AND 
HUMAN HEALTH (2004), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/99; 
NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 13; W.R. CORNISH, M. LLEWELYN & M. 
ADCOCK, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPRS) AND GENETICS: A STUDY INTO THE IMPACT 
AND MANAGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN THE HEALTHCARE SECTOR 
(2003).  
 50. CANADIAN BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMM., supra note 34, at 14–16. 
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that reason, legislative reform is a popular solution recommended by 
policy-makers and others seeking to remedy access problems.
51
 
Legislative reform is slow, however, and its direct link to practical 
outcomes is unclear. Passing legislation does not often ―make it so,‖ 
as state-based rule-making often ―shares‖ jurisdiction with other, 
more informal, rule-making processes. While legislative reform may 
clearly change behavior in some instances, in many others it is 
irrelevant, ignored, or ineffective; IP legislation is no exception.
52
 
Following the international Myriad controversy, only Belgium 
formally legislated a research exemption in its patent law;
53
 the 
European Parliament passed a resolution opposing the patenting of 
BRCA1 in October 2001,
54
 and France amended its patent laws to 
permit the grant of a compulsory license over diagnostics.
55
 
Legislation to limit the patenting of genetic technologies was tabled 
in the United States but never progressed.
56
 The effect of legislation 
on access in each of these jurisdictions is unknown, but there is no 
evidence to suggest that access concerns have alleviated as a result. 
Legislative reform suffers from the further drawback of being slow: 
Legislators often adopt a wait-and-see attitude, particularly when 
balancing the interests of private-sector actors critical to economic 
growth and development. Thus legislation is an unwieldy tool when 
technology is evolving quickly. 
B. State Law: Judicial Norm Creation (Case Law) 
Even if legislation proves unwieldy, the courts might step into the 
breach, evolving case law through precedent to adapt to new realities. 
 
 51. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM‘N, supra note 49; CANADIAN BIOTECHNOLOGY 
ADVISORY COMM., supra note 34; CORNISH, LLEWELYN & ADCOCK, supra note 49; NUFFIELD 
COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 13. 
 52. See Paul H. Robinson, Are Criminal Codes Irrelevant?, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 159 
(1994). For an example more particular to the IP context, see Andrew E. Burke, How Effective 
Are International Copyright Conventions in the Music Industry?, 20 J. CULT. ECON. 51 (1996). 
 53. GOLD & CARBONE, supra note 21, at 35. 
 54. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 13, at 40. 
 55. Law No. 182 of Aug. 6, 2004, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7, 2004, p. 14040, available at http://www.lexinter.net/lois4/ 
loi_du_b_aout_2004_relative_a_la_bioethique.htm.  
 56. Genomic Research and Diagnostic Accessibility Act of 2002, H.R. 3967, 107th Cong. 
(2002), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h107-3967. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/4
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Case law is, however, notoriously unpredictable, for it depends on the 
facts of the dispute brought before a court (unless one pursues a test 
case), the legal grounds, and the quality of advocacy, among 
numerous other factors. The effect of a case as precedent depends on 
a multitude of factors that include the nature of the legal system 
(common or civil law), the reputation of the judge deciding the case, 
the level of court, the legal framing of the dispute at hand, and even 
the accessibility and clarity of the written judgment. Judge-made law 
is also of limited effectiveness as it excludes other sources of norm 
creation that do not originate from the state. Myriad‘s aggressive 
defense of its gene patents did not result in litigation that could act as 
judicial precedent in any of the jurisdictions involved. Only the 
relatively litigious United States recently decided two cases that 
might affect access to patented genetic diagnostic technologies, 
neither directly related to the Myriad dispute. In the first case, the 
U.S. Supreme Court foreclosed an opportunity to consider the 
patentability of a diagnostic test when it denied certiorari in 
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite 
Laboratories, Inc.,
57
 thus limiting the decision‘s legal effect.58 In 
2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (―CAFC‖) 
considered the scope of the research exemption in patent law in 
Madey v. Duke University.
59
 The CAFC decided that although there 
was a research use exception, it was limited (in this case, in 
universities) to activities ―to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly 
philosophical enquiry.‖60 The decision led to speculation about its 
likely effect on researcher practices because it stood to limit research 
using patented tools and contribute to an access problem.
61
 A 
subsequent study of researcher practice by Walsh et al.,
62
 however, 
 
 57. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006). 
 58. The lower court‘s finding of patent infringement by the petitioner was thus upheld. Id. 
at 125; see also Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
2004). 
 59. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 60. Id. at 1362 (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng‘g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000)). 
 61. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Swords and Shields, 299 SCIENCE 1018 (2003); 
Richard R. Nelson, The Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons, 33 RES. POL‘Y 455 
(2004). 
 62. John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 
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found that Madey v. Duke University, although legally significant, 
had a negligible effect on the actual practice of research, 
demonstrating the importance of non-state sources of law-making to 
the legal regulation of IP.
63
 Walsh et al. found that only 5% of 
scientists regularly check for patents on knowledge inputs related to 
their research, and only 2% of those have begun checking for patents 
in the two years since the case was decided.
64
 Thus the available 
evidence, limited to U.S. sources, suggests that state-based law, 
whether in the form of legislation or case law, may have to work in 
tandem with other types of informal and influential rule-making to 
leverage access to health-related genetic invention.  
C. State Law: Canadian Intellectual Property Rules and Institutions 
State law is a possible nexus for ensuring access to valuable 
health-related innovation, but it is rarely adapted or amended in 
Canada, suggesting that the rules governing access to new innovation 
are being made elsewhere. State-based IP law in Canada is governed 
by federal statute, a power granted by the Constitution to the federal 
government over ―Copyrights‖ and ―Patents of Invention and 
Discovery.‖65 Canadian patent law enforces strict subject-matter 
exceptions, practices strong examination standards, and includes an 
exception for medical methods of treatment.
66
 The last major reform 
to the legislation came into force October 1, 1996; reforms to patent 
office practice and procedure happen through regulations, particularly 
the Patent Rules,
67
 and the Manual of Patent Office Practice.
68
 No 
 
SCIENCE 2002 (2005). 
 63. Id. at 2002–03. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 
(Appendix 1985). Trademarks are not explicitly addressed by the Constitution and are regulated 
under the federal government‘s authority over trade and commerce. Id. 
 66. I.e., does not practise ‗instantpatentgratification.‘ David Vaver, Canada’s Intellectual 
Property Framework: A Comparative Overview, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INNOVATION IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 1-1, 1-22 (Jonathan Putnam ed., 2006), 
available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ippd-dppi.nsf/vwapj/01-EN%20Vaver.pdf/$file/01-EN 
%20Vaver.pdf.  
 67. Patent Rules, SOR/96-423 (1996) (Can.). 
 68. CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE 
(1998), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr00720. 
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legislative reform is planned and the ―Biotechnology‖ portion of 
MOPOP, although currently under review, has not been revised for 
more than a decade.
69
  
Although state law is formally expressed in legislation, the 
government has created two administrative agencies pursuant to 
powers granted by the Patent Act that provide access to health 
innovation in Canada.
70
 Neither, however, facilitates access to the 
type of patented genetic innovation in question in this Article. The 
first, the Patent Medicines Prices Review Board (―PMPRB‖), 
established in 1987, sets the prices of patented medicines in the 
Canadian market and has met with sufficient success in fulfilling its 
mandate that U.S. citizens have imported in bulk lower-cost 
Canadian medicines.
71
 Second, Canada was the first developed nation 
to implement an access-to-medicines regime pursuant to a 2003 
decision of the World Trade Organization (―WTO‖).72 It did this a 
year after the WTO decision,
73
 and the Canadian Access to Medicines 
Regime (―CAMR‖) gives members with manufacturing capacity the 
right to grant compulsory licenses authorizing the export of patented 
pharmaceutical products to countries that are unable to manufacture 
their own.
74
 CAMR has yet to be used successfully to provide 
medicines for health emergencies in developing countries, but 
Rwanda has recently initiated the regulatory machinery to export 15 
million tablets of a drug used to treat AIDS manufactured by a 
Canadian generic drug company.
75
 Both agencies demonstrate that 
where political will exists (in this case, on the issue of access to 
medicines), the Canadian government can develop state-based 
solutions of varying degrees of efficacy to ensure access. These 
 
html. The MOPOP is currently under review to incorporate the Supreme Court of Canada‘s 
decision in Harvard College v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 2002 SCC 76 (Can.).  
 69. CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, supra note 68. 
 70. The PMPRB was established by section 91 of the Canada Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P-4 
(1985), and the Patented Medicines Regulations, SOR/94-688 (Can.). The CAMR was 
established by the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act, 2004 S.C., ch. 23 (Can.). 
 71. Rebecca Voelker, Northern Rexposure: U.S., Canada Clash on Cross-Border 
Medication Sales, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS‘N 2921 (2003). 
 72. Canada‘s Access to Medicines Regime, http://camr-rcam.hc-sc.gc.ca/intro/context_ 
e.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 30:43 
 
 
levers are not ideally suited to addressing the access concerns 
presented in this Article, however, because they rely on centralized 
control measures focused on one aspect of the access problem (price) 
in respect of one type of product. Disputes regarding access to 
valuable genetic innovation are polycentric and not obviously 
amenable to a single source or type of regulation and control. In 
addition, the access disputes over genetic innovation relate to many 
different types of innovation and rely on a continuously changing cast 
of characters and are thus less clearly adaptable to centralized 
control.  
Judge-made law is another ineffectual lever to ensure access to 
genetic invention between always changing parties in time-sensitive 
disputes involving the norms of business, healthcare innovators, and 
the law. Actions for patent infringement are brought to the federal 
court or superior court of any province and are heard by a judge 
alone. Although the patentability of genetic inventions directly 
related to health has not been considered, the Supreme Court of 
Canada (―SCC‖) decided in Harvard College v. Canada76 that 
―higher life forms‖ are not patentable, rejecting the dissent‘s 
observations that ―the massive investment of the private sector in 
biotechnical research [in Canada] is exactly the sort of research and 
innovation that the Patent Act was intended to promote.‖77 The 
holding in Harvard College was modified by the SCC‘s subsequent 
decision in Monsanto v. Schmeiser,
78
 which held that the fact that a 
claimed cell could form part of a higher life form does not mean that 
the claim to the cell should be equated to a claim to the higher life 
form.
79
 As a result, genetic technologies remain patentable in Canada, 
but there is great ambiguity about the extent of their patentability 
given the conflicting SCC decisions and an unrevised MOPOP. That 
ambiguity is unlikely to be resolved soon by the courts because 
 
 76. Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 2002 SCC 
76 (Can.). 
 77. Id. at 18. Higher life forms are defined as: plants, seeds, animals at any stage of 
development including fertilized eggs and to tipotentstem cells, which have the inherent ability 
to develop into animals. Id. at 14. Embryonic, multipotent and pluripotentstem cells, which do 
not have the ability to develop into an animal, are considered to be lower life forms. Id. at 15. 
 78. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.). 
 79. Id. at 89. 
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patent litigation in Canada is of low volume, largely focuses on 
disputes between brand name and generic pharmaceutical companies 
over the implementation of the Patented Medicines (Notice of 
Compliance) Regulations, and rarely reaches the Supreme Court of 
Canada.
80
 Thus patenting of genetic invention continues apace in 
Canada with some technical modifications to claims as a result of 
Harvard Mouse and Monsanto and with little litigation over those 
claims. This might be evidence that judge-made law leads more to the 
rent-seeking rather than rule-following behavior that an effective 
access regime would seek to avoid. 
Administratively, directing reforms to the Canadian Intellectual 
Property Organization (―CIPO‖) could be a possible lever, but it has 
limited contact with the parties concerned with providing access to 
health innovation.
81
 Instead, CIPO provides the security of a patent to 
international companies to market health innovations in Canada 
without introducing or embedding them further in the regulatory, 
legal, political, or socio-economic context of Canadian healthcare 
provision. In 2006 through 2007, CIPO received only 10,879 national 
patent applications, and 29,994 patent applications through the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, for a total of 40,873 applications.
82
 The vast 
majority of patents granted in Canada are to foreign patentees, mostly 
U.S. residents.
83
 Biotechnology patents form a very small proportion 
 
 80. CANADIAN BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVISORY COMM., HUMAN GENETIC MATERIALS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE HEALTH SECTOR (2006), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/ 
eic/site/cbac-cccb.nsf/eng/ah00578.html. Taking a four-year period, in 2005 the Supreme Court 
of Canada heard one patent law case related to the interpretation of the notice of compliance 
regulations. In 2006 and 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada heard no patent law cases. In 2008 
it is scheduled to hear one patent law case. 
 81. Note that CIPO does not take an active policy-making role, which is reserved to the 
Patent Policy Directorate. Intellectual Property Policy Directorate, http://www.ic.gc.ca/epic/ 
site/ippd-dppi.nsf/en/h_ip00003e.html#ppd (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 82. PCT applications originate outside the country as part of a bundle of patent 
applications to several states. Vaver, supra note 66. Combined European and PCT applications 
to the EPO in 2006 were 208, 502. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 15, 
available at http://documents.epo.org/projects.babylon/eponet.nsf/0/3713591e285bdd02c12572 
ff003ca152/$FILE/Annual_Report_2006.pdf.  
 83. In 2006–2007, 1,617 patents were granted to residents of Canada; 14,413 patents were 
granted to residents of foreign countries, 7,560 (47% of the total) of which were to U.S. 
residents. CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2006–07: SUPPORTING 
CANADIAN INNOVATION 52, available at http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-
internetopic.nsf/vwapj/ar06-07-e.pdf/$FILE/ar06-07-3.pdf. Japan and Germany were distant 
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of the patents granted by CIPO.
84
 Most Canadian patentees patent 
first in the United States and then, only if necessary, in Canada; in 
this respect, Canada‘s patent system and market resemble those of a 
developing rather than developed country.
85
 Moreover, CIPO neither 
collects information nor regulates licensing of patented innovation 
even though licensing of patented technologies is widespread in 
Canada. This further limits CIPO‘s possible role as a source of 
information to mediate disputes over access concerns. These facts 
and figures
86
 suggest no real role for CIPO in influencing access 
disputes over patents that it has granted. CIPO has reserved for itself 
the limited and technocratic job of granting patents to foreign 
innovation; how those patent tokens are received and used on the 
market is left to the patent holders. Patentees must mediate local 
realities, including the fact that a patent granted in Canada may have 
neither the strength nor the significance of a patent granted in the 
United States; anecdotal evidence from the private sector suggests 
that patents held by industry on diagnostic tests are so routinely 
ignored that private companies in Canada are unwilling to enter the 
business.
87
  
The discussion thus far has analyzed various state institutions and 
instruments such as legislation and has concluded that none is an 
obviously effective lever for norm creation in ensuring access to 
genetic innovation in the health field. I will now present empirical 
research that has investigated public universities and the culture of 
research scientists to determine whether they effectively generate 
binding norms for ensuring access and, if so, why. 
 
runners up. Id. To compare, 23.63% of patents granted at the EPO were to U.S. residents, 
closely followed by Japan (19.18%). EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 82, at 94–95. Of 
the top ten patent applicants in Canada in 2006–2007, only one could be considered a Canadian 
company, and of the top ten patentees in Canada in 2006–2007, none could be considered a 
Canadian company or a genetic invention company. 
 84. Only 3% of patents granted in 2006–2007 were for biotechnology patents. CANADIAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, supra note 83, at 50. 
 85. Manuel Trajtenberg, Is Canada Missing the ―Technology Boat‖? Evidence from 
Patent Data 15, Address Before the CSLS-Industry Canada Conference on Canada in the 21st 
Century (transcript available at http://www.tau.ac.il/~manuel/pdfs/Is%20Canada%20Missing% 
20Tech%20Boat.pdf); Phillip McCalman, Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of 
International Patent Harmonization, 55 J. INT‘L ECON. 161 (2001). 
 86. CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, supra note 83, at 51. 
 87. PIPER & GOLD, supra note 41, at 9–10. 
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D. Canadian Innovation 
Norm generation in Canada in this area is affected by the public 
nature of universities and the research culture of scientists. State-
based law appears to have little relevance to their work. Thus the 
courts, CIPO, and legislation do not reflect the vibrant biotechnology 
research and development (―R&D‖) community in Canada. Unlike 
the standard developing country profile, biotechnology R&D in 
Canada is significant ranking it as one of the top five countries for 
biotechnology R&D in the world, the majority of which is human-
health related.
88
 Universities are the second largest performers of 
R&D in Canada.
89
 The federal government is by far the largest single 
funder of scientific research in Canada
90
 and in 2004–05 spent $760 
million on biotechnology R&D.
91
 Thus universities are key to access 
in Canada as they direct and produce much of the important Canadian 
innovation in this area.  
Understanding university research is critical when considering 
Canadian innovation and access to technology issues, and its 
importance is likely to grow. The Canadian government has made a 
priority of closing the ―innovation gap‖ between itself and other 
industrialized nations as the key to long-term prosperity, and 
biotechnology is a priority sector.
92
 Canada does not perform well on 
markers of innovation: It ranks fourteenth in the OECD in private 
sector R&D investment as a percentage of GDP and sixteenth in the 
 
 88. Biotechnology—Invest in Canada, http://www.investiraucanada.gc.ca/eng/industry-
sectors/biotechnology.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 89. Wulong Gu & Lori Whewell, University Research and the Commercialization of 
Intellectual Property in Canada (Industry Canada Research Publications Program, Occasional 
Paper Series No. 21, 1999), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/eas-aes.nsf/vwapj/op21e. 
pdf/$FILE/9021e.pdf); Janet Thompson, Estimates of Canadian Research and Development 
Expenditures (GERD) Canada, 1994 to 2005, and by Province 1994 to 2003 9–12, 24 
(Statistics Canada, Working Paper No. 88F0006XIE2005020, 2005), available at http://www. 
statcan.gc.ca/pub/88f0006x88f0006x2005020-eng.pdf. 
 90. Donald Fisher & Janet Atkinson-Grosjean, Brokers on the Boundary: Academy-
Industry Liaison in Canadian Universities, 44 HIGHER EDUC. 449 (2002). 
 91. Biotechnology—Invest in Canada, supra note 88. 
 92. INDUS. CANADA, MOBILIZING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO CANADA‘S 
ADVANTAGE 24, 94 (2007), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ic1.nsf/vwapj/S&T 
strategy.pdf/$file/S&Tstrategy.pdf. The 2007 Science & Technology strategy states that is ―the 
OECD has estimated that every percentage point increase in business R&D as a proportion of 
GDP leads to a 12-per-cent increase in income per person in the long run.‖ Id. at 24. 
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OECD for high-quality patents per million of population.
93
 Closing 
the gap, however, has proven challenging: government research has 
identified few policy levers other than tax credits for scientific R&D 
to stimulate innovation and commercialization in the private sector.
94
 
This research further confirms the conclusions thus far that the levers 
for managing innovation in the health technology sector in Canada 
are likely both state and non-state tools. Given the volume and 
importance of research conducted in universities and on policy levers 
to encourage innovation there, universities remain an important area 
of focus in ensuring access to health-related innovation.
95
  
E. Research and Development: The Importance of Universities 
Canadian universities are critical non-state institutions whose own 
norms are rarely examined but are important to effect access to 
valuable health innovation. Universities are major participants in 
research and hold IP or incubate innovation for many valuable health 
technologies. Two factors determine more than others the types of 
non-state norms that are generated. First, most major Canadian 
research universities are public and share the same mandates of 
education, research, and community service.
96
 Thus a high degree of 
concurrence exists among the research objectives of the various 
universities and translates into publicly minded goals for their 
research outputs. Second, the goals of the universities are reflected in 
the attitudes of faculty members. Empirical research has found no 
link between financial incentives for university researchers and 
technology transfer outcomes in Canada.
97
 Researchers have been 
found instead to be motivated to participate in technology transfer by 
 
 93. Id. at 25.  
 94. David B. Audretsch et al., The Economics of Science and Technology, 27 J. TECH. 
TRANSFER 155 (2002). Encouraging high levels of transfer of university technology based on 
public sector funded research remains a top priority as part of a broader strategy to increase the 
R&D integrated into Canadian innovation. See INDUS. CANADA, supra note 92. 
 95. Katherine A. Hoye, University Intellectual Property Policies and University-Industry 
Technology Transfer in Canada (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Waterloo), 
available at http://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/10012/2855/1/kahoye2006.pdf. 
 96. Id. at 4.  
 97. Id. at 101, 108. Canadian researchers distinguish themselves from their U.S. 
counterparts in this regard. 
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its positive effects on scholarship, mentoring of graduate students, 
teaching performance, effects on the local or national community, 
and even the fact that researchers find creating spin-offs fun.
98
 Thus 
universities and their researchers produce and disseminate health-
related technologies with little leverage from extrinsic state-based 
factors such as revenues from IP rights; instead, their rules reflect the 
broader public purposes that govern researchers and their institutions.  
Technology transfer from researchers to the public is conducted 
by Technology Transfer Offices (―TTOs‖) at most Canadian 
universities that are direct levers to access innovation in Canada. 
TTOs are governed by their own distinct institutional norms. TTO 
officers, like the universities that house them, embody a mandate to 
act in the public good, but what that ―public good‖ looks like is often 
ill-defined.
99
 TTOs have effected this public good in a variety of 
ways, most strikingly to non-Canadian observers by allowing 
researchers in many cases to retain total or joint control of IP arising 
from their inventions at 61 out of 121 universities in Canada.
100
 TTOs 
have appreciated that what is most important in marketing invention 
in the Canadian context is unity of invention (i.e., one entity or 
person holds the IP), not who holds it.
101
 Canadian universities are 
not nearly as influenced by state-based norms as their U.S. 
counterparts, who are subject to the requirements of the Bayh-Dole 
Act,
102
 mandating commercialization of federally funded research.
103
 
Further, Bayh-Dole‘s lessons for Canada are of limited import to 
norm development at Canadian TTOs given Canada‘s distinct 
 
 98. Id. at 87, 101, 108. 
 99. Fisher & Atkinson-Grosjean, supra note 90, at 454. 
 100. Hoye, supra note 95, at 5. For purposes of comparison, ―in the United States, all but 
three universities retain the rights to IP developed by their faculty.‖ Id. (internal citation 
omitted). 
 101. TINA PIPER, E. RICHARD GOLD & OLIVER PLESSIS, A STUDY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES IN THE NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
CANCER RESEARCH SECTOR (2007); CHRIS RIDDELL, COMMERCIALIZATION STRATEGIES OF 
CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES: A STUDY FOR THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY 26 (2004); Hoye, supra note 95, at 50, 112. 
 102. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2000). 
 103. Id. Bayh-Dole‘s value as a policy model export is unclear. Researchers doubt that a 
Bayh-Dole-type model would have a similar effect on Canadian research, given the very 
different research contexts, histories, and structure of public research. Hoye, supra note 95, at 
7–8. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 30:43 
 
 
technology transfer context.
104
 TTOs initiate and maintain 
relationships with private-sector partners through licensing and other 
business development arrangements. Thus TTOs are critical to 
leveraging a commitment to access to innovation. Although 
encouraging industry to enable access to health-related genetic 
inventions is important, and qualitative empirical research shows 
industry claims to support access goals, there are fewer direct levers 
to do so.
105
 University TTOs are a direct lever, informed by rules 
developed in light of their research institutions and the TTO‘s own 
internal norm-generating structure.  
The institutional priorities and rules governing TTOs are further 
influenced by their unique situation in the Canadian health innovation 
landscape and their efforts to develop a professional identity. TTOs 
traditionally have been organized to commercialize university 
innovation through patenting, promising innovations, and then 
licensing those innovations, mostly through exclusive licenses with 
industry.
106
 TTOs thus derive their main income from licensing, and 
most aim to be financially self-sufficient. Licensing university 
technologies is not generally lucrative for Canadian TTOs, and most 
Canadian TTOs are not self-supporting.
107
 Compared to counterparts 
in the United States, TTOs at universities are also relatively new: 
Although a number of universities founded ―Research Offices‖ in the 
1970s, modern TTOs did not develop until the mid-1980s.
108
 TTO 
 
 104. David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University-
Industry Technology Transfer: A Model for Other OECD Governments?, 30 J. TECH. 
TRANSFER 115 (2005). 
 105. PIPER & GOLD, supra note 41, at 9–10, 19–23.  
 106. ASS‘N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM CANADIAN LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY 
FY 2006, available at http://www.autm.net/about/dsp.Detail.cfm?pid=216. TTOs also are 
responsible for in-licensing technologies to be used by their members. TTOs engage in a range 
of activities in addition to licensing, including fostering spin-offs, maintaining links with 
industry, nurturing collaborations with external partners, and otherwise managing IP on 
university technologies.  
 107. Although thirty-eight Canadian TTOs reported receiving $65,863,816 in licensing 
income in 2006, when TTO costs are considered, those numbers are very low. Id. The detailed 
results suggest that rather than providing a consistent income, commercialization acts more as a 
lottery ticket with high income generated from a few particular innovations. 
 
 108. Fisher & Atkinson-Grosjean, supra note 90. Compare this to U.S. counterparts that 
have been in operation since the early 20th century. Rima D. Apple, Patenting University 
Research: Harry Steenbock and the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, 80 ISIS 375, 377–
78 (1989). 
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officers are involved in actively defining a professional identity that 
involves creating a mission distinct and independent from oversight 
and control by home institutions and government.
109
 As part of this 
initiative, Canadian TTO officers have been integrated into the U.S. 
Association of University Technology Managers network (―AUTM‖) 
and attend annual meetings.
110
 Further, TTOs are seeking to develop 
more subtle measures of their own performance than revenue 
generation, in accordance with their vision of the public good and a 
more coherent sense of their professional mandate.
111
 The success of 
a TTO has traditionally been measured by the number of licenses it 
concludes and the revenue it has generated.
112
 Thus TTOs are norm-
generating institutions with a sense of public service; given their 
important role in the ecology of technology development and transfer 
in Canada, they are critical levers for managing access to health 
technologies. 
F. How to Influence Access: TTO Practice, Researchers, and 
Universities 
Based on the conclusions above, TTOs, researchers, and 
universities can be influenced by a range of tools to facilitate access 
to health innovation in Canada. The most common tools include 
drafting IP policies, providing voluntary guidance to TTO officers, 
changing metrics of TTO performance, implementing measures 
targeting researchers, encouraging license-bundling initiatives, 
creating an independent third body to mediate access disputes, and 
encouraging dialogue and information sharing between TTOs and 
others in the ecosystem of Canadian innovation. I argue that the most 
likely tools to influence norm generation in the TTO context are 
 
 109. MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
ANALYSIS (1977). 
 110. ACCT Canada, Our Partners, http://www.acctcanada.ca/index.php?option=com_ 
content&view=article&id=6:our-partners&catid=5:our-partners&Itemid=2 (last visited Apr. 10, 
2009). 
 111. For a recent example, see ASS‘N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING 
ACTIVITY SURVEY FY 2007, at 4, 10–11, available at http://www.autm.net/content/Navigation 
Menu/surveys/LicensingSurveysAUTM/FY2007LicensingActivitySurvey/AUTMUSLS07FIN
AL.pdf. 
 112. See ASS‘N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 106.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 30:43 
 
 
those that account for the TTOs‘ institutional characteristics, the 
characteristics of Canadian innovation in the field, and other cultural 
and local factors.  
First, revising the IP policy that governs the university research 
and its TTO is one possible lever for implementing 
commercialization practices that encourage access. IP policies, 
however, are not guaranteed means of effecting changes in licensing 
behavior. IP policies have a broad signaling function, and their 
content (for example, university- or faculty-owned IP policies) may 
affect faculty support for technology transfer.
113
 There is, however, 
no observed relationship between the content of IP policies and 
technology transfer outcomes.
114
 Interview-based research we 
conducted into this question confirms that a TTO‘s IP policy does not 
structure its daily behavior and in many cases is out-of-date. The 
policy‘s over-arching principles, however, do seem to play some role 
in the organization‘s function.115 We observed that there remains a 
strong perception that an institutional IP policy has a great impact on 
how technology transfer is conducted.
116
 Similar results have been 
observed in studies of legislation in the criminal law area, where 
criminal codes, rarely read by the general public, play a role in 
creating an environment of order, confidence, and direction.
117
 The 
motivating power of IP policies seems to depend entirely on how 
members of the university interpret them, and this will vary 
institution by institution and depend on the organizational history of 
the institution including its group norms, leadership, and culture.
118
 
Ultimately, the IP policy is likely to have greatest effect on behavior 
when it is seen as a document produced in consultation with 
important stakeholders that reflects the institution‘s policies, 
practices, culture, and mission, rather than minutely dictating 
practice.  
TTO practices and behavior are not much influenced by changes 
in IP policies where those changes do not acknowledge the 
 
 113. Hoye, supra note 95, at 18–21, 27–30.  
 114. Id. 
 115. PIPER, GOLD & PLESSIS, supra note 101. 
 116. Hoye, supra note 95, at 115. 
 117. Robinson, supra note 52, at 196. 
 118. Hoye, supra note 95, at iii, 109. 
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institutional norms and culture of the TTO. Research by Herder and 
Johnston
119
 on Canadian and some U.S. TTOs indicates that any type 
of policy guidance to TTOs has to preserve their discretion to decide 
on a case-by-case basis.
120
 Herder and Johnston‘s research found that 
from the perspective of TTO officers, guidance and advice were more 
likely to change behavior than mandatory requirements.
121
 TTOs 
operate on rules of thumb in a complex policy environment, and a 
range of factors influence whether and how to license an 
innovation.
122
 Mandatory requirements, such as adhering to the 
OECD Guidelines, and interventionist oversight processes, such as 
commercialization committees imposed by funding agencies, threaten 
to slow down or even forestall decisions to commercialize an 
innovation.
123
 Thus a second lever is voluntary measures adopted by 
the community of practice (here, the TTO) and could include 
circulating examples of how other IP professionals have resolved 
problems, sharing fora for TTO officers and others to discuss 
problems, and providing model language for agreements.
124
 This 
model was supported by TTOs as a key means of influencing norm 
generation by TTOs. All the TTO officers in the Herder and Johnston 
study reserve educational and research rights in licensing agreements 
for the home institution and were willing to accept direction on those 
types of terms, but were less willing to cede authority for the decision 
of whether to exclusively or non-exclusively license their 
innovation.
125
  
Third, norm generation in the community of practice of TTO 
officers is a reflexive process; the norms adapt based on the success 
or failure of a particular strategy. The most common means of 
measuring success or failure thus far have been measurements of 
licensing revenue. Changing these metrics emerges from our 
 
 119. Matthew Herder & Josephine Johnston, Licensing for Knowledge Transfer in Human 
Genetics Research: A Study of Business Models for Licensing and Technology Transfer in 
Human Genetics Patents (Mar. 23, 2007), http://www.theinnovationpartnership.org/data/ 
documents/00000015-2.doc. 
 120. Id. at 37–38. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 38–39. 
 123. PIPER, GOLD & PLESSIS, supra note 101. 
 124. Herder & Johnston, supra note 119, at 38. 
 125. Id. at 45–49. 
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empirical research as the most promising lever for influencing TTO 
behavior on the theory that what you measure is what you get.
126
 
Existing metrics of disclosures, patents filed/issued, licenses, spin-off 
companies, license income, and sponsored research tend to skew 
TTO behavior toward maximizing those markers. TTOs have 
expressed a desire for broader metrics that they could use readily. For 
example, if an organization‘s goal is broad dissemination of 
knowledge and the development of useful clinical tools, it could 
measure the number of students trained, disclosures, and/or clinical 
applications developed or implemented (regardless of patent status). 
These metrics should comprise criteria such as a TTO‘s contribution 
to the public benefit, to public health, or to more specific health-
access markers. The change in metrics could and should be initiated 
at a university-wide level, spearheaded by leaders within the 
university (such as the VP research), and could be integrated as part 
of a broader vision of TTO practice that includes making university 
publications and other materials accessible. Government could also 
play a role in creating funding opportunities for research that studies 
and proposes new metrics. TTOs, the private sector, public healthcare 
providers, and government-funded laboratories could then discuss 
and share local information about promising innovation, licensing 
practices, and strategies to ensure access. This type of initiative is 
already underway in the annual meetings of TTO officers and has led 
to creative suggestions such as encouraging TTOs to specialize by 
technology area rather than based on geographical location.
127
 
Information collection and sharing initiatives hold promise in 
improving access to health-related innovation.  
Fourth, given the strength of self-generated norms in the TTO 
community of practice, it is unrealistic to impose Guidelines and 
other policy direction. These documents are not a dead letter, 
however. External documents, particularly Guidelines, can be used in 
an unpredictable manner by TTOs to obtain desired outcomes by, for 
example, using them as a foil in negotiations.
128
 Further, TTOs may 
support requiring researchers to explain how proposed 
 
 126. PIPER, GOLD & PLESSIS, supra note 101. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Herder & Johnston, supra note 119, at 46. 
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commercialization of a federally funded project accords with the 
OECD Guidelines or other access goals as a means of informing 
broader communities of their role in ensuring access to their 
innovation. Given the conclusions about researcher motivations 
highlighted above, it is realistic to think that this may be an effective 
lever in Canada.  
Finally, given the importance of TTO discretion and self-identity, 
collective measures that bring TTOs into dialogue with one another 
may be effective levers to ensure access to health innovation. One 
measure could be a collaborative bundling or pooling approach to 
licensing with standard terms of access to technologies that may in 
the end generate valuable collective norms across TTOs. Bundling 
and pooling may lead to explicit model contracting terms that 
facilitate or provide access. Further, a quasi-governmental third-party 
body could mediate access disputes across interested parties as those 
disputes arise, serving as a forum for neutral dialogue in resolving 
particular access disputes. This non-state entity could mediate the 
norms that govern the TTO community of practice, providing binding 
or non-binding results. Without this organization, parties currently (as 
in the Myriad and Warnex examples above) tend to resort to the 
language of the law when other attempts to communicate break 
down. As has been demonstrated, formal legal mechanisms are 
unlikely to effectively alter behavior and are perceived as illegitimate 
and irrelevant given their poor comprehension of the informal rules 
that govern the practice of access to health innovation in Canada. 
Formalizing arbitration based on the interested parties and their 
relevant rules of practice could lead to more mutually acceptable 
resolution of access disputes. 
III. WHAT IS ACTUALLY HAPPENING 
The failure of state law to provide solutions to the access debate 
has helped foster initiatives to influence the practice of TTOs through 
non-state mechanisms. I will examine three types of initiatives 
(licensing, international standard-setting, and information gathering) 
and examine why they have been more or less successful. The 
examples posed support my thesis that the initiatives that have been 
most successful or seem to be most promising are those that have 
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accounted for contextual formal and informal features of the rule-
making culture.  
A. Private Ordering Through Open Source Licenses 
The first initiative I will consider is the development of open 
source licensing communities for health innovation to facilitate 
access. Patent holders may consent to grant others rights under their 
patent through the voluntary mechanism of a license negotiated 
between the patentee and a second party, subject to the general law 
on contracts.
129
 Information about licenses should ideally be collected 
at the national level, as in Japan, for example, but it is not.
130
 As a 
result, very little is known about who is licensing what to whom, and 
under what terms.
131
 Further, there is no obligation to make the terms 
of licensing agreements public, even when they cover important 
technologies such as medicines essential to treating serious 
diseases.
132
 Licensing practice thus remains embedded within a 
regime of private ordering and is regarded as a trade secret by some 
industries. What information does exist suggests that licensing is 
common and widespread. In Germany, for example, about half of 
patented inventions held by research institutions and biotechnology 
companies are licensed.
133
  
The commercial development of a patented product is often 
determined by how it has been licensed (exclusively, solely, or non-
exclusively). An exclusive license permits only the licensee (and 
whomever she authorizes) to exploit the patent, barring even the 
 
 129. Licenses are sometimes created unilaterally without consideration. The distinction 
between a contract and a license is significant in U.S. law, for it determines whether the federal 
(license) or the state (contract) government will regulate the innovation.  
 130. Letter from E.R. Gold to author (Oct. 26, 2007) (on file with author). 
 131. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), GENETIC INVENTIONS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES: EVIDENCE AND POLICIES 45, 48 
(2002), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/21/2491084.pdf; see also Mark A. Lemley & Nathan 
Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market (Stanford Law & Economics Olin Working Paper 
Series, Working Paper No. 347, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012726. 
 132. See Luke Eric Peterson, More Anti-Virals in the Hands of Politicians, EMBASSY, OCT. 
19, 2005, at 1, 11, available at http://embassymag.ca/pdf/view/2005-10-19. 
 133. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), supra note 131, at 46. The data 
are unclear, however, as to whether licensing statistics covered multiple licenses on a single 
patent, and there are no data available for pharmaceutical companies. Id. 
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patent-holder from the rights.
134
 A non-exclusive license allows the 
patent holder to retain rights to exploit the patented invention and 
also to license the invention to others on any terms it likes. Patent 
licenses are rarely stand-alone documents; they fit into a much 
broader commercial strategy.
135
 Thus licenses have traditionally been 
used to circumscribe access to a particular innovation in pursuit of 
market exclusivity. 
Licenses, however, also can be used just as easily to broaden 
access to innovation. The open source software movement 
demonstrated that licenses could in fact specify that the right-holder 
was only reserving some of her IP rights. The open source movement 
was founded by computer programmers who shared computer code 
using standardized open source licenses, creating new norms of 
sharing, re-use, and adaptation that stood in contrast to state-based IP 
law. These licenses allowed programmers, who often never met, to 
share and redistribute code by permitting creators to choose which 
aspects of copyright protection such as use, reproduction, 
modification, or distribution of the product they wished to allow third 
parties to exploit, and in what circumstances. The licenses helped 
create the rules that supported a complex community of practice that 
added, edited, patched, and modified software, which was very 
successful in producing a high-quality product.
136
 The popularity of 
open source licenses in programming has demonstrated a high level 
of acceptance of shared non-commercial uses in some communities 
for certain products, destabilizing prevailing narratives about the 
importance of ever-stronger IP rights to ensuring productivity and 
disclosure.
137
 Open source licenses also empirically support the 
 
 134. Exclusive licenses may be limited to a particular country, for a specific period of time, 
or for a specific use, thus allowing potentially several exclusive licenses on one patent. 
 135. Licenses are frequently involved in the creation of a spin-off company, a strategic 
alliance, or a joint venture, and licenses may be implicated in manufacture and collaboration 
agreements. Licenses may allow companies to exchange information and resources or provide a 
company with access to a new market by providing access to manufacturing or distribution 
networks. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM‘N, supra note 49. 
 136. ERIC RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN 
SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY 72–78 (Tim O‘Reilly ed., rev. ed. 2001). 
 137. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); RAYMOND, supra note 
136. 
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proposition that property rights and economic reward are only one of 
many types of incentives (including altruism and reputation) 
encouraging people both to innovate and also to disclose their 
innovation.
138
  
Initiatives built on the open source insight to apply standardized 
licensing and ―copyleft‖ type terms to medical and genetic innovation 
in the hopes of similarly providing access to valuable public health 
products. An international NGO, the Public Intellectual Property 
Resource for Agriculture (―PIPRA‖),139 has been developing a 
humanitarian clause for material transfer licenses that would create 
royalty-free material transfers from developed to developing 
countries, but the status of this project is unclear.
140
 The Bios 
initiative aimed to establish an open source community of genetics 
researchers subscribing to licenses with copyleft-type provisions. 
This project has found that patents are ill-suited to open source, and it 
is difficult to mimic the open source effect to broaden access to 
patented innovation.
141
 
The reason why an open source research community has not 
spontaneously developed or been nurtured in the area of health 
innovation (particularly genetics) may lie in the conflict between 
normative orders and a failure to account for contextual rule-
generating and rule-following characteristics. Scientific research is 
norm-dependent and relies on practices that both mimic and differ 
from formal IP law.
142
 Open source initiatives standardize norms 
 
 138. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOMS 79, 82–83 (2006); Samuel Trosow, The Illusive 
Search for Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital, 16 CAN. J.L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 217 (2003). Open source showed that software developers as a community 
often were driven by goals of altruism, e.g., by creating a low-cost, high-quality operating 
system, and reputational rewards through being credited in software development and becoming 
known within the project community. RAYMOND, supra note 136, at 53; Nicholas Economides 
& Evangelos Katsamakas, Linux vs. Windows: A Comparison of Application and Platform 
Innovation Incentives for Open Source and Proprietary Software Platforms (NYU L. & Econ. 
Working Paper Group, Paper No. 05-21, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=822894. 
 139. See Pipra—the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture, http://www. 
pipra.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2008). 
 140. See id. 
 141. Richard Jefferson, Freedom to Cooperate: Initiative for Open Innovation PatentLens 
& BiOSRJ, Presentation at the Washington University in St. Louis Conference on Open Source 
and Proprietary Models of Innovation: Beyond Ideology (Apr. 4–5, 2008). 
 142. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol30/iss1/4
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Access to Patented Health Related Genetic Invention 71 
 
 
according to legal standards that may differ significantly from reality, 
thus making licensing projects unappealing. Tailoring copyright law 
through licenses functioned well for the way programmers 
programmed code, but it is unclear that it works for other 
communities of shared endeavour that labor in different contexts (for 
example, biochemistry researchers). Thus, modes of sharing scientific 
information in and between different scientific research disciplines 
are often not well reflected in standard form licenses that reflect the 
current state of the law.
143
 Science Commons encountered this 
obstacle when it attempted to draft a license that would allow data-
sharing between disciplines and settled instead on a protocol or 
certification system: The protocol would accredit indigenous data-
sharing practices as open-access without requiring researchers to 
adopt a standardized legal definition of the term.
144
 Similarly, WIPO 
and others are in the process of developing concordances that are 
effectively mutual non-assertion covenants, supervised by a central 
oversight party that respects the varying normative orders in 
heterogeneous research communities.
145
 Thus attempts at ensuring 
open source licensing of health-related technologies stumble upon 
contextual factors such as the nature of the research community 
involved. 
B. International Standard Setting 
A further tool for effecting access to health-related genetic 
invention has been to develop multilateral international guidelines to 
influence behavior at the national level, as formal state-based rules 
have failed to appear to modify behavior. This type of law-making is 
characterized by its voluntariness, attempted normativity,
146
 and 
limited or (in this case) non-existent enforcement mechanisms.
147
 The 
 
Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-
Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003). 
 143. Science Commons, Database Protocol, http://sciencecommons.org/resources/faq/ 
database-protocol/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Jefferson, supra note 141. 
 146. They purport to create standards of behavior and to influence behavior in those subject 
to it. 
 147. Simon B. Archer & S. Tina Piper, Voluntary Governance or a Contradiction in 
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OECD Guidelines for the Licensing of Genetic Inventions (―OECD 
Guidelines‖) were developed to focus on the licensing of patents over 
genetic inventions in member countries.
148
 In addition, the U.S. 
National Institutes of Health (―NIH‖) prepared voluntary Research 
Tools Guidelines
149
 and Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic 
Inventions.
150
 All set out best practices and guidelines for the 
licensing of genetic and genomic inventions as appropriate, but I 
focus on the OECD Guidelines in the discussion as directly 
applicable to Canadian policy-makers.
151
  
The OECD Guidelines are intended to assist both OECD and non-
OECD governments in developing governmental policies and 
influencing licensing behavior.
152
 Thus the OECD Guidelines are 
neither directive nor binding; they merely ―provide a framework 
within which to conceive of voluntary, market-oriented licensing 
arrangements with respect to genetic inventions.‖153 The first part of 
the document sets out a number of principles and then a series of best 
practices that should govern each of licensing, health and genetic 
inventions, research freedom, commercial development, and 
 
Terms: Are Voluntary Codes Accountable and Transparent Governance Tools?, in SOMETHING 
TO BELIEVE IN: CREATING TRUST AND HOPE IN ORGANISATIONS STORIES OF TRANSPARENCY, 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND GOVERNANCE (Rupesh A. Shat et al. eds., 2003); Owen E. Herrnstadt, 
Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct: What’s Missing?, 16 LAB. LAW. 349 (2001). 
 148. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GUIDELINES FOR LICENSING OF GENETIC 
INVENTIONS (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoed/39/38/36198812.pdf. The 
Guidelines were based on earlier research (pre-dating the Myriad controversy) into the effect of 
human gene patents on research and access to medical products. 
 149. Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts, 64 
Fed. Reg. 72090 (proposed Dec. 23, 1999), available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/pdfs/64FR72090. 
pdf.  
 150. Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions: Final Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 
18413 (Apr. 11, 2005), available at http://ott.od.nih.gov/pdfs/70FR18413.pdf. 
 151. Although I will not discuss the NIH Guidelines in great detail, they are significant in 
that along with the OECD‘s Guidelines, they encourage non-exclusive licensing of genetic and 
genomic inventions whenever practicable, especially in respect of foundational inventions. 
Further, they target licensing practices that threaten to limit researcher access to genetic and 
genomic knowledge. The NIH Guidelines are significant in that they are the governing policy of 
one of the world‘s most influential funding agencies, presiding over grants to major genomic 
and genetic research projects, and they may apply to Canadian commercialization agreements. 
Herder & Johnston, supra note 119. 
 152. The OECD is a forum that brings together the governments of its thirty member 
countries to support economic growth and development. It also compiles statistics, economic 
data, and social data, and it monitors economic trends. 
 153. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 148, at 5. 
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competition.
154
 Several pages of annotations at the end of the 
document clarify the intended meaning of each of the general 
provisions.
155
 The most important best practices encourage rights 
holders to broadly license genetic inventions for research and 
investigation purposes
156
 and state that health-related inventions 
should be licensed to ensure the broadest public access.
157
 The best 
practices also stipulate that foundational genetic inventions should be 
licensed on a non-exclusive basis
158
 and encourage limiting the use of 
exclusive licensing and reducing coordination problems through 
pooling and other arrangements to ensure that the best products and 
services are brought to market.
159
 
By setting out standards through guidelines, the OECD 
encourages effective legal regimes relevant to the local context,
160
 
allowing national institutions an active role in developing 
understandings based on on-the-ground realities and particularities.
161
 
Parties are encouraged to adopt a holistic, cooperative, and creative 
approach adapted to local circumstances while staying as close to the 
international standard as possible.
162
 The general and non-binding 
nature of the Guidelines, along with its explanatory comments, 
suggests that the OECD is engaging in a process of norm 
development rather than harmonization. The unenforceable, 
voluntary nature of the standard is its greatest strength and 
weakness.
163
 The standard can be adapted and applied (and may even 
provide a regulatory advantage) in a local context, but its 
unenforceability means that it can be easily ignored.
164
 Thus its 
success and influence will depend on the extent to which it is 
incorporated by domestic institutions, and this in turn will depend on 
 
 154. Id. at 5–6. 
 155. Id. at 13–22. 
 156. Id. at 9. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 12. 
 159. Id. at 20, 22. 
 160. Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing 
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 123–24 (2003). 
 161. See id. at 111 (discussing when rules can be understood only in the context of a free-
standing legal order). 
 162. Id. at 100–02. 
 163. Id. at 102. 
 164. Archer & Piper, supra note 147. 
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the extent to which the norms expressed in the Guidelines cohere 
with the internal institutional objectives of TTOs and others. Thus a 
process will be necessary to ensure the appropriate translation of the 
Guidelines. 
In Canada, the University of British Columbia (―UBC‖) has 
developed Global Access Principles
165
 that express a commitment to 
building on the values of access and dissemination, promoting non-
exclusive licensing based on the OECD Guidelines, and considering 
field-of-use and jurisdictional limitations in exclusive licenses to 
exclude developing countries.
166
 UBC is also a member of the West 
Coast Licensing Partnership, an initiative to bundle technologies 
from nine West Coast research institutions in four areas: animal 
models, biomarkers, medical imaging, and medical devices. A single 
license covers all the research institutions, and all licenses issued are 
non-exclusive, with the goal of ―increasing global access to research 
tools by promoting and enhancing non-exclusive licensing.‖167 
Federally, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research,
168
 Genome 
Canada,
169
 and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council
170
 have developed, or are in the process of formulating, open 
access to research output policies that will affect all grantees in 
relation to publications, software, materials, and data. While limited 
data as yet are unavailable, existing nascent initiatives suggest that 
the voluntary approach of the Guidelines has been useful in bridging 
and influencing rule-making cultures.  
 
 165. The Univ. of British Columbia, Principles for Global Access to UBC Technologies, 
http://www.uilo.ubc.ca/global.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 166. Id. 
 167. W. Coast Licensing P‘ship, The Benefits, http://www.westcoastlicensing.com/ 
benefits.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 168. Canadian Institutes of Health Research, Policy on Access to Research Outputs, 
http://www.cihr-irsc.gc.ca/e/34846.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 169. Genome Canada, Data Release and Resource Sharing Policy, http://www. 
genomecanada.ca/medias/PDF/EN/DataReleaseandResourceSharingPolicy.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2009).  
 170. Soc. Sciences & Humanities Research Council of Can., Policy Focus: Open Access, 
http://www.sshrc.ca/site/about-crsh/policy-politiques/open_access-libre_acces/index-eng.asps 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
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C. Information  
A third approach seeks to provide information about the nature 
and scope of existing patent rights in order to enable better rule-
making by institutions seeking to secure access to innovation. In 
theory, patent law grants an exclusive monopoly in return for a public 
disclosure of the innovation to teach the public and other innovators. 
A potential downstream inventor can access the patent‘s claims and 
specifications in the public registry and understand the technical 
advance from that document, as well as the area in which she can 
safely innovate.
171
 As the system has evolved in practice, however, 
the information provided by national patent offices is incomplete and 
poorly serves the underlying rationale. Although patent disclosures 
provide basic information about what has been invented and by 
whom, they supply limited information on the broader ecology of 
invention, e.g., how, by whom, where, and under what licensing 
terms the technology is being developed.
172
 Further, the scope of a 
patent may be clear only upon litigation for infringement, and 
specifications are increasingly drafted to reveal as little as possible.
173
 
These factors mean that patent disclosure at the patent office is of 
limited use to innovators and the public. Thus, civil society, through 
groups such as PIPRA
174
 and CAMBIA‘s Patent Lens,175 has 
conducted technology landscape and freedom-to-operate analyses to 
understand the nature and breadth of existing patents and policies for 
specific diseases or crops.
176
 These initiatives provide invaluable 
information about the patent ecosystem, including the breadth and 
strength of existing patents and terms of control, and they suggest 
gaps for research and innovation.
177
 These projects provide critical 
 
 171. Vaver, supra note 2. 
 172. Except through studies of patent citation statistics.  
 173. Vaver, supra note 2. 
 174. About Pipra, http://www.pipra.org/en/about.en.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 175. Patent Lens, Explore Technology Landscapes, http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/ 
patentlens/landscapes-tools.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 176. See, e.g., Influenza Genome Executive Summary, http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/ 
influenza/4132.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009); Rice Genome Landscape: Table of Contents, 
http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/RiceGenome/3648.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 177. See, e.g., Mapping of Rice Patents and Patent Applications onto the Rice Genome, 
http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/RiceGenome/3909.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
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information to justify the exclusive monopoly granted by a patent; the 
groups involved arguably are generating norms that information must 
be aggregated or contextualized in order for it to be truly available or 
disclosed to the public.  
Concretely, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada and the University 
of Saskatchewan are both members of PIPRA.
178
 UBC‘s TTO has 
undertaken to modify its metrics and in the process aggregate and 
disseminate different information about its technology processes, in 
collaboration with the NGO Universities Allied for Essential 
Medicines (―UAEM‖).179 UBC‘s TTO reviewed its portfolio of 237 
active license agreements and evaluated them based on academic, 
societal, economic, financial, and political impacts. The results 
included the conclusion that 68% of its licenses have a minor or 
negligible impact and that licenses with the most potential to gain 
impact as time progresses tend to be life science technologies. For 
those technologies where societal impact has the greatest potential, it 
takes ten to fifteen years for half of these technologies to reach their 
potential.
180
 Information collection and aggregation initiatives are too 
early in development to determine whether they are successful at 
bridging the gap between state and non-state rule-making orders but 
provide promise for the future. 
CONCLUSIONS  
The proliferation of patent rights in recent years has resulted in 
real and predicted access problems to health-related genetic 
invention. This Article has examined situations where IP rights have 
ostensibly blocked access to health-related genetic innovation. 
Various tools have been proposed to remedy these access barriers, 
many of which envision top-down state-based rule-making processes; 
these initiatives have produced few results. I argue that unblocking 
access to innovation will be determined by non-state, rather than 
 
 178. About Pipra Members, http://www.pipra.org/en/about.en.html#members (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2009). 
 179. Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, http://www.essentialmedicine.org/ (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2009). 
 180. Angus Livingstone, New Metrics: Communicating the Value of Technology Transfer 
to Your Constituents, Presentation at Health Canada Workshop (Mar. 28, 2008). 
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state-based, rule-making regimes and norms in Canada because of the 
nature of the institutions that inhabit the ecology of Canadian 
innovation. The Article considered as a case study two access 
disputes in Canada and the state and non-state norms that could lever 
access to those technologies, concluding that university-based TTOs 
are the most likely lever. Initiatives that then give these TTOs room 
to develop rules and practices coherent with their institutional 
priorities, identity, and purposes will be most successful in providing 
access. These types of initiatives will include information 
aggregation projects and voluntary standard-setting initiatives. This 
Article suggests that research time and energy should be invested in 
both investigating local contexts and designing novel schemes and 
initiatives.  
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